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THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT-
BASIC STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MANUFACTURERS
CONNIE KEMP JOBE
Q N OCTOBER 13, 1979, the Department of Commerce,
through its Task Force on Product Liability and Accident
Compensation, issued the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
(UPLA).' The objective of the UPLA is to resolve the following
problem areas that have developed in the field of product liability:
liability insurance ratemaking procedures,' unsafe manufacturing
practices,' and uncertainties in the tort-litigation system.' It is
hoped that the adoption of the UPLA, by bringing uniformity and
stability into the law of product liability, will stabilize liability
insurance rates and will help to insure that consumers injured by
unreasonably unsafe products receive reasonable compensation
for their injuries.!
The most controversial aspect of product liability litigation has
been the issue of defining the basic standards of responsibility to
which product manufacturers are to be held.' The Task Force has
concluded that most of the controversy results from the fact that
'MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as UPLA].
244 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). In 1975 a crisis arose concerning liability
insurance for manufacturers and businessmen. Many writers alleged that such
insurance had become unavailable or unaffordable. This situation could have
had serious consequences for the businessman and the consumer: many busi-
nesses would have had to terminate because they would have been unable to ob-
tain coverage, injured consumers would have been left uncompensated, and
manufacturers would have been hesitant to produce potentially dangerous prod-
ucts which are useful to society. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978).
3The problem primarily concerns small businesses which are unable to de-
vote sufficient resources to this area. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1978).
4Product liability rules are constantly changing in each of the fifty different
jurisdictions. Many courts have come to regard product liability law as nothing
more than a compensation device for injured consumers. The tort-litigation sys-
tem, however, was not designed to serve this purpose. The courts must balance
the economic burden on the manufacturers to produce a safe product against the
probabilities that the product may cause injury. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,616 (1978).
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
I1d. at 62,721.
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section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS7 focuses
primarily on manufacturing defects and not on defects concerning
design or the duty to warn.' Courts, therefore, have been left with
little guidance while attempting to define standards of responsibility
pertaining to design,9 and duty to warn, defects. 0 Conflict among
courts subsequently developed as to whether a strict liability or
negligence standard should be imposed on manufacturers whose
products contained such defects.11
Section 104 of the UPLA seeks to dispel some of this con-
fusion by setting forth the following criteria relating to the basic
standards of responsibility to be imposed on manufacturers of a
defective product. The UPLA divides product defects into four
categories:
A product may be proven defective if, and only if:
(1) It was unreasonably unsafe in construction (Subsection A);
(2) It was unreasonably unsafe in design (Subsection B);
(3) It was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or in-
structions were not provided (Subsection C); or
(4) It was unreasonably unsafe because it did not conform to the
product seller's express warranty (Subsection D).1
See note 32 infra.
844 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,722 (1979). See Epstein, Products Liability: The
Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643, 648 n.16 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Epstein]. The author notes that the definition of "defect" in section 402A
considers a product to be defective "only where the product is, at the time it
leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." By strictly applying this
definition, the expansion of design defect cases would be effectively precluded. Id.
' Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 424, 573 P.2d 443,
450, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1978) (liability imposed by merely showing
product's defectiveness); Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859, 865
(1979) (manufacturer not required to produce product which represents ulti-
mate in safety); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 489, 525 P.2d
1033, 1037 (1974) (unreasonable dangerousness of design determined by con-
sidering surrounding circumstance of manufacturer's knowledge at time article
sold).
10Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir.
1969) (imposed duty to warn of dangers in non-defective but potentially harmful
products); Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312, 329 (1965) (duty
to warn relates to latent defect, not to defect which is well known); Smith v.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (1979) (breach of
duty for failure to warn determined by standard of reasonable care under cir-
cumstances).
11 See notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text.
1244 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
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Within these four categories, two different standards of liability
are imposed on manufacturers. Strict liability is imposed for de-
fects in construction and for breach of an express warranty,"3 and
a negligence standard is imposed for defects in design and for
failure to provide an adequate warning."
This comment examines the effect the UPLA will have on the
common law developments in the area of product liability con-
cerning the standards of responsibility for manufacturers. Each
type of defect is treated separately in order to show the extent to
which the Act's proposals will alter the way courts have treated
each defect in the past. Finally, this paper offers an evaluation
of Section 104's effectiveness in alleviating some of the problems
that have developed in this area.
I. UPLA-RoOTS IN COMMON LAW
Product liability law has developed in response to our society's
industrial and technological development." The mass production
of goods created the need for an effective cause of action in tort
for consumers injured by defective products.' The remedy first
available to such consumers was based upon contract law and the
concept of negligence. This remedy, however, posed several difi-
culties for potential plaintiffs since a consumer could not bring a
negligence-based products liability suit unless he stood in con-
tractual privity with the manufacturer. 8 Justice Cardozo's land-
mark opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." made this
remedy more widely available to consumers by concluding that
despite a lack of privity, an injured consumer could maintain a
13 Id. at 62,722.
14 Id.
1 See generally L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, I PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1-1 to
1-10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
1"See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-14
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel]; Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel].
17 Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Butaud
v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 884 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Comparative Negligence].18 Id.
18217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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direct negligence action against the manufacturer." Basic prin-
ciples of negligence, however, continued to be used with little
modification to determine liability in product cases."' Under the
negligence based remedy, the manufacturer was held responsible
for injuries caused by the ordinary use of his product whenever a
defect brought about the plaintiff's harm."
Gradually, attempts were made to expand the theories of re-
covery to encompass a concept of strict liability independent of
any negligence analysis." The law of warranty was the original
basis used to expand the strict product liability theory.' In taking
this approach, the courts theorized that the manufacturer or seller
expressly or impliedly warranted the safety of the product." The
seller was held to a standard of strict liability if the injured con-
sumer relied upon the statements and the statements proved to be
false. Various limitations," however, were placed upon this rule
of liability.
The remedy of strict liability for product defects came into its
own in the early 1960's. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
20Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
"Epstein, supra note 8, at 649.
"See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
"Comment, Comparative Negligence, supra note 17, at 884-85.
24See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). In
Baxter the manufacturer distributed literature which stated that glass in the
windshield of an automobile was "shatterproof." The court imposed strict lia-
bility upon the manufacturer when the consumer subsequently was injured. The
consumer testified that he read and relied upon the manufacturer's statements.
See also Prosser, supra note 16, at 1124-34.
2 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(cigarettes); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1960) (tires): Arfons v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d
Cir. 1958) (dynamite); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275,
302 P.2d 331 (1956) (mattress); Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App.
2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955) (boned chicken); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn.
710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (detergent); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Sup. 198,
188 A.2d 884 (1963) (automobile); Spiegal v. Saks 34th Street, 43 Misc. 2d
1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (cosmetics); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 2d 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (permanent wave
solution).
6 Generally the courts have held that the statement made by the manufacturer
must be a representation of a fact, and not mere "puffing" or sales talk. The
representation must be made by the defendant or by one of his agents. Further-
more, the defendant must intend that the statement reach the plaintiff. Finally,
the plaintiff must establish that he relied upon the manufacturer's representations.
See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 16, at 838-40.
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Inc.2 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court held both the automobile
manufacturer and the dealer liable to the injured consumer with-
out any showing of negligence or privity of contract.' Three years
later Justice Traynor, writing the majority opinion in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," went beyond Henningsen and con-
cluded that strict liability did not require a basis in contract war-
ranty but could be based on strict liability in tort."0 A third judicial
change occurred in the late 1960's when courts began to apply a
strict liability theory of recovery on behalf of casual bystanders
who were injured due to a product's defect." Finally in 1965, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS adopted the principles of strict
liability by adding section 402A, which requires that before a seller
can be held strictly liable he must sell a product in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" to the user.'
One of the principles underlying strict product liability is that
one who engages in the business of selling a product impliedly
represents that the product it places in the stream of commerce is
free of defects.' In establishing a claim based upon strict liability,
a plaintiff must show that the product was defective when the de-
2732 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
- 161 A.2d at 77, 100.
- 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
30377 P.2d at 900.
,1 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451
P.2d 84 (1969).
32RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability or physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140,
149 (N.J. 1979), citing Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342
A.2d 181 (1975).
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fendant placed it into the stream of commerce.' Determining
whether a product is defective has never been easy.' Many courts
have adopted section 402A as a basis for imposing strict product
liability, but the uniformity ends here.' Considerable differences of
opinion have developed concerning the definitions of the terms
"defective"3 and "unreasonably dangerous."' There is also dis-
agreement as to whether a plaintiff should be required to prove
that the product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous."
Dean John Wade, who was one of the reporters for section 402A,
has stated that both terms serve a clear purpose in determining
whether or not a seller should be held liable for the injury his prod-
uct causes to a consumer.40
The UPLA adopts similar terms in defining the standards of
8' 406 A.2d at 150.
See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3B-126 (1979).
e See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence
to Misuse and Assumption of Risk, 43 Mo. L. REv. 643, 646 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Fischer].
3
"Id. at 646; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5
ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 35-36 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Keeton, Manu-
facturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 562-65 (1969).
1 Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973)
(reasonable seller would not sell product with knowledge of risks involved or if
risks greater than reasonable buyer would expect); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1973) (product
dangerous to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer
with knowledge common to community). See also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach.
Co., 269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (reasonable person would
not put product into stream of commerce with knowledge of harmful character-
istics); Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective
Goods: "Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44 J. Am L. & CoM. 705, 714 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Walkowiak].
' See notes 92-95 infra and accompanying text.
4 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 830-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade]. Dean Wade contends that the
two terms may seem redundant, yet both were employed for a reason. The
natural application of the word "defective" would be limited to the situation
where something goes wrong in the manufacturing process. It would be difficult
to apply the term to defects concerning design and to inadequate warnings. In
addition, a product may be defective yet not likely to cause injury. The term
"unreasonably dangerous" when used alone presents additional difficulties. It con-
notes ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous products, which in turn gives the
impression that the plaintiff must prove that the product is unusually or extremely
dangerous.
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responsibility for manufacturers.' It differs, however, in one im-
portant aspect. Instead of requiring the product to be both "defec-
tive" and "unreasonably dangerous" before liability may be im-
posed, the UPLA uses the term "defective" to encompass each of
the four types of unreasonably unsafe products. ' By using the word
"defective" as a generic term, the UPLA may arguably be inter-
preted as treating the terms "defective" and "unreasonably unsafe"
as being synonymous. The treatment of these terms could have
been clarified had the Act defined the roles that the judge and jury
are to play in a product liability case.' The failure to define these
roles suggests that the two terms are not to be given separate con-
sideration. Thus, the primary determination in a product liability
case will be for the trier of fact to decide whether the product is
unreasonably unsafe. Only if the product is determined to be "un-
reasonably unsafe" can it then be labeled "defective".
Since much of the controversy in product liability suits con-
cerns the determination of whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous, various writers have proposed different tests for mak-
ing this determination." By adopting the synonymous term "un-
reasonably unsafe," the UPLA accepts some of the tests that have
been proposed and rejects others. The analysis of the Act expressly
rejects the consumer expectation test.' This test imposes liability
41 The UPLA substitutes the term "unreasonably unsafe" for "unreasonably
dangerous."
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979).
In actions based on strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity,
the judge traditionally determines whether liability should be imposed since
issues of general social policy are involved. In product liability cases the courts
seem to have approached the problem differently. In these cases the plaintiff
must convince the jury that the product was "defective" or "unreasonably danger-
ous." A problem arises when the case involves a design defect. Policy issues
become very important since a whole class of products will be labeled unsafe.
In these instances, the court must make several initial determinations in deciding
whether the case should be submitted to a jury. See Wade, supra note 40, at
838-39. It is unclear under the UPLA whether the court must make an initial
inquiry concerning relevant policy issues. The Act suggests that the trier of fact,
regardless of whether it is the judge or the jury, must weigh the policy issues
involved. As a result, determining whether the product is "unreasonably unsafe"
and thus "defective" involves only a single analysis.
"See notes 46-53 infra and accompanying text.
144 Fed. Reg. 62,724 (1979). See notes 125-33 infra and accompanying
text. The test stems from the attempts of various courts to interpret Com-
ment i of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A. Comment i states that
to be unreasonably dangerous the "article sold must be dangerous to an extent
1981]
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if the product fails to meet the ordinary consumer's reasonable
expectations as to the safety of the product.' Several noted authori-
ties support this test"7 by arguing that the consumer's expectations
of the product's performance should be indicative of the type of
supplier conduct that would be acceptable."* Conversely, the UPLA
accepts the risk-utility test. 9 This test requires balancing the gravity
and likelihood of the harm and the burden of taking precautions
against the utility of the product." The risk-utility approach is
used by many courts in determining negligence liability;-' more-
over, various courts have readily adopted this approach in apply-
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
4" See Walkowiak, supra note 38, at 714.
47 See Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28
DRAKE L. REV. 317, 342 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as Phillips]; Twerski and
Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judg-
ment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 230 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as Twerski].
' Phillips, supra note 47, at 343.
4944 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
' Professor Wade has suggested that seven factors be considered in making
the risk-utility determination:
1. The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
2. The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury.
3. The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
4. The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
5. The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
6. The user's anticipated awareness of the damages inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowl-
edge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence
of suitable warnings or instructions.
7. The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.
Wade, supra note 40, at 837-38.
" Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 12 Ill. App. 3d 739,
299 N.E.2d 86 (1973); Sut Kowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d
313, 381 N.E.2d 749 (1972); Coger v. Mackinaw Prod. Co., 48 Mich. App. 113,
210 N.W.2d 124 (1973); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d
286 (1972); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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ing strict liability." Balancing the risk-utility factors will help to
determine whether a product is to be labeled "unreasonably un-
safe." Like the term "unreasonably dangerous," the term "unrea-
sonably unsafe" will need further elaboration before it can serve
as a useful standard in measuring the worthiness of various product
liability claims.' The meaning of "unreasonably unsafe" takes on
special significance in the context of the UPLA's four categories
of defective products, since the threshold consideration in every
product liability case will be to determine whether the product is
"unreasonably unsafe".
II. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
UNDER THE UPLA
A. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Construction
Subsection A of section 104 of the RESTATEMENT imposes strict
liability on the manufacturer for defects that result from the manu-
facturing process." The most significant aspect of imposing strict
liability for defects in construction is that the seller will be liable
regardless of whether he was in any way at fault or whether he
exercised the greatest possible care.5 Attention will be directed
away from the manufacturer's conduct and instead will focus on
the injury-producing product." Strict liability eliminates the re-
quirement that the manfacturer "knew or should have known"
of the defect in the product." Since section 104 imposes strict
liability for releasing a defectively manufactured product into the
stream of commerce, the plaintiff is not required to establish that
the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care.
Innumerable cases have been decided by imposing strict lia-
2 Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 31 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979); Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 12 Il1. 3d 739,
299 N.E.2d 86 (1973); General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979).
"See Keeton, supra note 37, at 32.
"44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,722 (1979).
"Montgomery and Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 808 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Montgomery].
56 Id. at 808-09.
5 7 See Walkowiak, supra note 38, at 718.
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bility for an injury arising from a defective condition in the manu-
facturing process." The fact that the manufacturer places the goods
on the market and solicits their sale through advertising and at-
tractive packaging has always presented a convincing argument
for imposing strict liability for such defects." The manufacturer
intends and expects the consumer to purchase his product and to
use it in reliance upon his assurances of safety; therefore, the
manufacturer should not be able to avoid the responsibility when
the use of the product leads to injuryY Prior court decisions have
consistently imposed strict liability for manufacturing defects."
Furthermore, imposing strict liability also appears to adhere to the
dictates of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS."
In construction defect cases, the obvious assumption is that the
defect has arisen because the manufacturer has been negligent
in the production process.' The manufacturer may not be negli-
gent, however, where the injury is due to a latent defect that was
not capable of detection during production." Additionally in some
instances thorough testing could result in partial or total destruc-
"See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 3B-1 18.3-30.
5See Prosser, supra note 16, at 1122.
60 Id.
1 Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (revolver);
Walczak v. General Motors Corp., 34 Ill. App. 3d 7731, 340 N.E.2d 684 (1976)
(steering malfunction); Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 31 Ill. App. 3d 72, 334
N.E.2d 417 (1975) (brakes failed); Novick v. Textron, Inc., 375 So. 2d 730
(La. App. 1979) (rotor system in helicoper tail); Lahocki v. Contee Sand &
Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490 (Md. App. 1979) (roof of van); Roy Matson Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 277 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1979) (tire);
Holkestad v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Minn., Inc., 180 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1970)
(exploding bottle); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Or. 597, 575 P.2d 1383
(1978) (axle); Rupe v. Durbin Corco, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn. App. 1976)
(loader).
62 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 10 (1965).
6" See Phillips, supra note 47, at 344.
64 Id. at 345. See, e.g., Pabon v. Hakensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super.
476, 164 A.2d 773, 783-84 (1960). In Pabon the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
damages from an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained when the steering
mechanism on his automobile locked. The plaintiff claimed that defective ball
bearings were used in manufacturing the automobile. The court rationalized that
the manufacturer had received the ball bearings fully assembled from another
reputable manufacturer. Furthermore, the latent defect was not discoverable by
reasonable inspection methods. Id. at 783.
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tion of the product or could make its cost prohibitively expensive."'
The UPLA fails to allow for situations where the defect was in-
capable of being detected during the production process. Imposing
strict liability in these situations would be unnecessarily harsh.
Before the manufacturer can be held responsible under a strict
liability theory, a standard must be established by which a de-
fective product may be measured."6 As with the theory of negli-
gence, liability for an injury may not be imposed unless the prod-
uct fails to meet this standard."7 The UPLA provides that the
manufacturer himself will provide the standard for comparison."'
Any deviation from his own plans or specifications will be con-
sidered a manufacturing defect.
There has been significant criticism of judging the manufacturer
by his own standards rather than by the standards of the indus-
try."' One of the criticisms stems from the possibility that a manu-
facturer could be penalized for building into his product a high
safety standard not required or followed by the industry."' It is
the position of the UPLA that the long-term effects of using this
standard will be advantageous to the manufacturer. The drafters
of the UPLA reason that the manufacturer who imposes a higher
standard on himself may occasionally be subjected to liability for
manufacturing defects, but it will be less likely that his whole
product line will be found unreasonably unsafe in its design."
This rationale overlooks one factor. Judging a manufacturer by
his own standards rather than by the standards of the industry,
significantly increases the risk that a manufacturer who has im-
posed higher standards on himself will be found liable for a con-
struction defect. Since the UPLA has imposed a standard of strict
liability for producing products with such defects, this greatly in-
creases the potential risk that the manufacturer will be subjected
I Id. See Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414, 415
(1934) (meat packer not liable for consumer's death caused by ingestion of
trichinosis pork since complete sterilization of pork would cause loss of freshness).
6 See Walkowiak, supra note 38, at 712.
67 Id.
0844 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
"See Twerski, supra note 47, at 225; Phillips, supra note 47, at 345.
" See Twerski, supra note 47, at 225.
7144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
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to liability for taking additional precautions. The drafters contend
that by taking the extra precautions it is less likely that the manu-
facturer will be found liable for producing a product which is
unreasonably unsafe in its design. The UPLA, however, imposes
a negligence standard on design defects."' The negligence standard
employed by the UPLA places the burden of proof on the injured
claimant, not on the manufacturer."3 Therefore, the fact that a
manufacturer's total liability would appear to increase if he im-
poses a higher standard on himself might destroy his incentive to
take extra precautions.
Judging a manufacturer by his own standards will require im-
posing liability for any flaw in the product which causes an injury
to the plaintiff. As one authority has noted, it is inevitable that
certain structural irregularities or flaws will appear in any metallic
structure.' Some manufacturers often introduce these irregulari-
ties to enhance certain properties of the structure.' In instances
such as this, the standards imposed on the industry as a whole
should clearly be examined in determining whether the manu-
facturer should be subject to liability. A risk-utility analysis would
be helpful in these situations. If the usefulness and desirability of
the product outweigh the likelihood of injury, it should be sufficient
that the manufacturer has met the industry's standards rather than
the higher standards he has imposed on himself.
Even though the plaintiff shows that the product deviates from
the manufacturer's own plans and specifications, the product must
also be proven "unreasonably unsafe." Every minor variation will
not make the product unreasonably unsafe. The variation must be
material, and it must be the cause of the plaintiff's harm. ' Thus,
liability may be imposed for a manufacturing defect if the plain-
tiff satisfies a two-step process: first, he must show that the prod-
uct did not meet the standards which the manufacturer has set
72 Id. at 62,722.
73 d. at 62,723.
4 Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction
of Law and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 425, 430 n.11 (1974).
75 Id. The authors note that additional elements are often added intentionally
to form alloys which are stronger than the parent metal (brass is an example
of a substitutional solid solution produced by the addition of zinc and copper).
7144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
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for himself; and, second, he must show that the defect in the
product rendered it unreasonably unsafe-that it was a material
defect and that it was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Once
these two factors have been established, the product may be con-
sidered defective. The UPLA's analysis for determining whether
the product is unreasonably unsafe is clear and concise. It avoids
the use of the consumer expectation test," and it also avoids the
necessity of imputing knowledge of the defective condition to the
manufacturer under a negligence standard.'8
B. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Design
Unlike the strict liability standard imposed on manufacturers for
construction defects, the UPLA imposes a negligence standard on
manufacturers for injuries caused by products which are unreason-
ably unsafe in their design."m Manufacturing defects are usually in-
advertent, whereas design defects generally stem from the intended
result of the manufacturing process.80 A design defect usually
affects the manufacturer's entire: line of products and results from
a conscious choice of the manufacturer based on his desire to
balance the need for safety against such factors as utility, attrac-
tiveness and cost.8' A design defect may take various forms: the
absence of safety devices, defects in a formula, dangerous side
effects, or a product's giving way in an unexpectedly dangerous
manner." The drafters of the UPLA state that imposing a negli-
gence standard for design defects is consistent with prior court
decisions." There exists, however, evidence supporting a contrary
conclusion.
As states began adopting the principles of strict liability, many
courts applied them to design as well as to manufacturing defects."
11 See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
8 See generally Walkowiak, supra note 34, at 714.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
80 See Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Lia-
bility, 46 CINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (1977).
"See Phillips, supra note 47, at 345.
2Id. at 347.
8144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
84Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978) (truck); Barker
v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)
(high lift loader); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d
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Other courts have refused to follow this trend." There are sig-
nificant similarities in analyzing a cause of action based on strict
liability which arises from the design of a defective product and
a cause of action based on negligence, but differences between the
theories do exist." In a negligence action, the issue is whether the
manufacturer's conduct matches that of the reasonably prudent
manufacturer." In a strict liability action, the manufacturer's con-
duct is irrelevant. The issue is simply whether the product was too
dangerous." In a negligence action, the manufacturer also is as-
sumed to have had knowledge of all foreseeable risks; in a strict
liability action, the manufacturer's knowledge is irrelevant.
The requirement of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS that the product must be "unreasonably danger-
ous" seems to be the basis of the conflict in determining whether
to apply a strict liability or a negligence standard to design defects.
The courts and writers who espouse the strict liability standard
reject the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of 402A by
requiring that the plaintiff need only establish the product's de-
fectiveness." Other authorities maintain that the term "unreason-
229 (1970) (paydozer); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421
(1974) (fertilizer applicator); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602
Mo. 1977) (golf cart).
There are several reasons for applying a strict liability standard for design
defects. First, even though design defects may often be attributable to fault,
it is generally difficult for the injured consumer to establish fault. Second, products
will be made safer if strict liability is imposed on manufacturers for design
defects. Third, the manufacturer can effectively distribute the risk by accepting
responsibility for losses from accidents. See V. WALKOWIAK, THE UNIFORM PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACT 3-7, 3-8 (1980).
11 Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (auto-
mobile accelerator mechanism); Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md.
288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975) (automobile); Suter v. San Antonio Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) (industrial sheet metal rolling machine);
General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, no writ) (automobile roof).




90 Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978) ("unreason-
ably dangerous" and "defective" are synonymous); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.,
Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978) (plaintiff
required only to show product's defectiveness); Keeton, supra note 37, at 32
(unreasonably dangerous intended only as definition of defect); Montgomery,
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ably dangerous" plays an important role in all design defect cases."
It should be noted, however, that most of the courts which apply
a strict liability standard also require that an evaluation be made
of the risk-utility factors." The risk-utility test is similar to the
balancing approach employed by most courts in determining the
issue of "reasonableness" in the negligence case.'
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.," the California Su-
preme Court held that in a design defect case the plaintiff should
not be required to prove that a product was unreasonably danger-
ous as well as defective."5 The court determined that a product
would be labeled defective if the plaintiff satisfies either of two
tests." The first test requires the plaintiff to show only that the
design did not perform as safely as the ordinary consumer would
expect when it was used in a foreseeable manner." The product
is defective if it fails this "consumer expectation" test.
Even if the product satisfies the consumer expectation test, it
may still be labeled defective if it fails the second test, which in-
volves a risk-utility analysis. Under this test, the plaintiff must
prove that the product proximately caused his injury."' After this
fact is established, the defendant has the burden of showing that
the utility of the product outweighed the risks involved." The
court's stated purpose for this formulation was to relieve the in-
jured plaintiff of the onerous evidentiary burdens which are in-
supra note 55, at 842 (plaintiff should not be required to prove both defect and
unreasonable dangerousness-only defectiveness).
11 Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (un-
reasonably dangerous requirement serves valuable function due to conscious
tradeoff among safety, utility and cost); Green, Strict Liability Under Section
402A and 402B; A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 1185, 1207-08 (1976)
(not essential to show that product is defective, only that it is unreasonably
dangerous) [hereinafter cited as Green].
91Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1977); Cepeda v. Cumber-
land Eng'r Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); General Motors Corp. v.
Turner, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
'Walkowiak, supra note 38, at 736.
' 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
"573 P.2d at 446.
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herent in a negligence cause of action.' Shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant is consistent with the fundamental public
policy leading to strict liability. 10 1
The UPLA incorporated a portion of the Barker court's analysis
by requiring that the trier of fact weigh specific risk-utility factors
in determining liability. ' Unlike the Barker court, however, the
UPLA places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 3 The plaintiff
must show that, in light of the risk-utility analysis, the product
was unreasonably unsafe in its design.'" By placing the entire
burden of proof on the plaintiff, the UPLA seems to lose sight of
the purpose of products liability in a highly complex, techno-
logical society. As noted by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.,1" the consumer who is injured by a defective
product is unprepared to meet the consequences.'"' Unlike the
manufacturer who is in a position to discover and evaluate the
inherent dangers,0 7 the consumer does not have the skill or the
means to investigate the soundness of a product."0
Employing the analysis of the Barker court would require eval-
uating a design defect under the principles of strict liability rather
than negligence. This approach provides fair treatment to both
the consumer and the manufacturer. The plaintiff first would be
required to show that his injury was proximately caused by the
100 Id. at 455.
101 Other courts have recently adopted a strict liability standard for design
defects. See Turner v. General Motors, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). In Turner
the Texas Supreme Court imposed a strict liability standard for design defects.
The court stated that the jury should be instructed to follow a risk-utility analysis
in determining if the design was defective; however, they are not to be given
specific factors to consider in conducting the test. Id. at 847. See Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Suter rejected the use of "unreasonably dangerous" as well as
"defect" in the strict liability charge to the jury. The court noted that requiring
proof that the design was "unreasonably dangerous" imposed an unnecessary
burden on the injured plaintiff. Id. at 152.
02 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
103 Id.
104 id.
10 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor J., concurring
opinion).
10 Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
107 Id.
100 Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
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defective design of the product."' After causation is established,
the manufacturer would be required to prove that the utility and
benefits involved outweighed the risks imposed by the chosen
design.1  The negligence standard proposed by the UPLA would
place the burden of proving that the risks outweighed the utility
on the plaintiff, creating an insurmountable obstacle in many cases.
The factors involved in making this analysis are clearly within
the knowledge of the manufacturer, not the injured plaintiff. 1'
In outlining the risk-utility analysis, the UPLA sets forth a
formula which requires the trier of fact to balance two pairs of
factors. '12 The formula involves weighing "the likelihood that the
product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and
the seriousness of those harms against the manufacturer's burden
of designing a product that would have prevented those harms,
and the adverse effect that the alternative design would have on
the usefulness of the product.".. 3 Evaluating these two factors
makes it clear that the manufacturer is not required to design a
product that is the "ultimate in safety.11.
In addition, the UPLA sets forth important evidence that the
trier of fact should consider in balancing the factors."' First, proper
and adequate warnings by the seller of the risks may prevent a
product from being found defective in design."" Such warnings
alone, however, will not relieve the seller of liability if the product
could have been made more safe through the use of an alternative
design."" Second, the manufacturer must present evidence which
shows that it was not technologically and practically feasible to
design a product which could have substantially served the user's
"o Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., Inc., 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56
(1978).
"i0 Id.
" See Twerski, supra note 47, at 227-28. The authors state that liability based
upon foreseeability of the risk always should be determined by strict liability,
for there is no issue more difficult for the plaintiff to litigate than what the
manufacturer's state of knowledge should have been for someone with expertise
in his field.
144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
113 Id.
"Kearns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859, 865 (1979).
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needs and also could have prevented his injury." ' It is unclear, how-
ever, when the burden of proof is shifted to the manufacturer. Im-
posing a negligence standard would require that the burden of proof
initially be on the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer did not
exercise the care of a reasonable man under the circumstance.119 To
do this, the plaintiff must show that an alternative design is more
than just a technical possibility. If the alternative design destroys
the usefulness of the product or if it significantly increases the
product's cost, it would be an unacceptable alternative. 2 '
The final two factors to be considered in applying the formula
also deal with the practical feasibility of the alternative design.
The third factor establishes the need to consider the alternative
design's effect on the usefulness of the product.'' A risk-utility
analysis will be essential to achieve a proper balancing."' Thus, it
will be important to examine the likelihood that the product as
designed will result in an injury, the seriousness of the potential
injury, the ability of the manufacturer to eliminate unsafe char-
acteristics without impairing the usefulness of the product or sig-
nificantly increasing its cost, and whether the product is more
dangerous than would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer." The fourth factor requires a consideration of the costs
of production, distribution, selling and maintaining the product
as it is designed."8
Finally, the UPLA rejects the use of the consumer expectation
"
8 Id. When the product liability area began to expand, it appeared to take
little more than a suggestion from the plaintiff that an alternative design was
available in order for a jury issue to arise. To recover, the plaintiff was required
to only redesign the product so that it would prevent the particular injury that he
suffered. Epstein, supra note 8, at 650.
"
9
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 96 at 644 (1978).
1044 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
121 Id.
= Id.
23 Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Penn. 1978). See also Hagans
v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1978); Dreisontok v. Volks-
wagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Carrol Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or.
485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974).
12144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
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test... in determining whether the product's design is defective."
The test has been criticized for requiring too much subjectivity
on the part of the trier of fact."' Applying the test requires a case-
by-case analysis, taking into consideration the age, background,
skill and experience of the plaintiff."' Although in many cases the
test will produce a simple and sound result," ' in others it will pro-
duce results inconsistent with a risk-utility analysis." The test
leaves little room for a finding of liability where the defect is open
and obvious or where the person injured is a bystander."' In addi-
tion, there are two dangers inherent in the consumer expectation
test. First, the consumer's expectations may reflect industry prac-
tices and thus may be very low if consumers become accustomed
to dangerously designed products." Second, in cases involving
new and unfamiliar products, expectations of safety may tend to
be unreasonably high, thus imposing a hardship on the manufac-
furer who fails to prevent a risk of which he is unaware." The
test is an imprecise method for imposing liability and is rightfully
rejected by the drafters of the UPLA.
" The basic thrust of the test is that liability should be imposed whenever
a manufacturer leads customers to believe that a product will perform at a
certain level and then the product fails to satisfy those expectations. Twerski,
supra note 47, at 231.
"'44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).
.. Id. See Green, supra note 91, at 1205-06. Professor Green criticizes the
test for imposing a fictitious standard on the jury. This test requires the jury to
analyze liability using abstractions most commonly used in negligence cases.
See also Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in
Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1974). The authors
argue that the perspective of the reasonable consumer should be abandoned.
The inquiry instead should be whether the public would demand a less dangerous
product when given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives to the
product.
128 Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus.
LAw. 589, 593 (1967).
"I Montgomery, supra note 55, at 823.
"10Id.
"'1 Id.
112 Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 ORE.
L. REV. 293, 297 (1975).
"' Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339,
350 (1974).
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C. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because Adequate
Warnings or Instructions Were Not Provided
If the presence of a design defect is difficult for the plaintiff to
establish because there exists no feasible design alternatives, the
plaintiff may be able to argue that the manufacturer failed to pro-
vide adequate warnings or instructions.'" Liability can be estab-
lished for a failure to warn without encountering the difficulty and
expense of obtaining expert testimony or of preserving evidence
which may be needed to establish a design defect." In addition, it
is much easier for the jury to evaluate the adequacy of warnings
and instructions than it is for them to evaluate the deficiencies of
a complex design.' 3
The primary purpose of a duty to warn is to inform the con-
sumer that a product is likely to be dangerous for its intended
use, where there is reason to believe that the consumer will not
appreciate the dangerous condition. ' The duty normally arises
in cases involving unreasonably dangerous products that contain
either defects or dangers which cannot be eliminated. The UPLA
imposes liability if the manufacturer fails to provide an adequate
warning concerning the product's hazards or sufficient instructions
about its use, regardless of whether the product is found to be
unreasonably unsafe in its design or construction."'
The Act requires a showing of negligence before liability may
be imposed for a failure to warn."3 Therefore, as in cases involv-
ing design defects, the plaintiff will be required to prove that the
manufacturer knew or should have known that harm would be
likely to occur in the absence of a proper warning or instructions."'
In the past, the duty to warn could arise under either negligence
or strict liability principles.' The duty to warn under negligence
See Twerski, supra note 47, at 234.
133 Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings,
23 Sw. L.J. 256, 260 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Noel].
136 Id. at 260-61.
137Note, 25 KAN. L. REV. 442, 444 (1977).
1644 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
13 9 d.
140 Id.
14' But see Green, supra note 91, at 1211. The suggestion that liability for a
failure to warn should be based upon negligence overlooks the fact that 402A
imposes a duty of strict liability so that the issue of care is irrelevant. Id.
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principles is set forth in section 3 8 8 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS.' Various courts have followed section 388 by imposing
a negligence standard in determining liability.'' As many courts
began adopting the principles of strict liability,'" they began to
distinguish between a negligent failure to warn and the duty to
warn under a strict liability concept. "'
The UPLA rejects the concept of strict liability for claims based
upon a failure to warn.' 6 Warnings, however, are of value only
to those consumers who can be attentive to them. In certain situa-
tions, a warning will have no effect on some classes of foreseeable
'4'2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965):
§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its danger-
ous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
" Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978)
(shipper negligently failed to warn of dangers inherent in inhalation of fumes);
Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (foreseeable
that users of firework kits would be children); Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp.,
437 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1971) (foreseeable that combination of chemicals could
cause anemia); Hontschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.
1954) (occurrence of household fire is not reasonably foreseeable); Hall v. E. I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (foreseeable
that children would acquire blasting caps); Stigler v. Bell, 276 So. 2d 799 (La.
App. 1973) (sticking needle in spray can not reasonably foreseeable); Westerberg
v. School Dist. No. 792, Todd County, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312 (1967)
(could not anticipate that purchaser would alter product's condition).
'"2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment j (1965): "To
prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be
required to give directions or warnings, on the container, as to its use."
"I Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1979) (mounting of tire
on wrong size rim); Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 577 F.2d 873 (5th
Cir. 1978) (blowout of steel belted radial tire); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Al E & C
Ltd., 539 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976) (fifty-two ton end box fell during lifting
operation); Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971) (coating com-
pound exploded when subjected to heat beyond flash point); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio vaccine caused plaintiff
to contract polio); Tuscon Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936
(1972).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
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consumers, such as children who are too young to appreciate the
warning or bystanders who may not be aware of the warning." '
In these situations, a warning would fail to reduce the risk level
of the product. Therefore, strict liability would still serve a justifi-
able purpose for these classes of consumers. '
In determining whether liability should be imposed for a failure
to warn, the UPLA sets forth two separate issues which should be
examined." 9 First, was there a duty to warn or instruct the con-
sumer about a particular matter? Second, was the warning or in-
struction that was given adequate?' In making these determina-
tions the trier of fact may not use hindsight, but is required to
put himself in the position of the manufacturer at the time the
product was manufactured.15' It is important that the trier of fact
focus on the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's
harm, the seriousness of the injury, the adequacy of any warnings
that were given, and the practical effects of providing the warnings
or instructions which the plaintiff contends should have been
provided.""
The UPLA lists several factors that should be considered in
making these determinations.1 First, in determining whether there
was a duty to warn, the manufacturer must have the ability at the
time the product is manufactured to know of the dangerous effects
of the product and the nature of the harm that is likely to be in-
curred.1 ' A plaintiff, however, by using the product in an unusual
fashion, is capable of inventing a "duty to warn" situation which
can far exceed the capacity of the manufacturer to provide ade-
quate warnings."m The plaintiff's use of the product in such a
14 Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability-Design Defects Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 495, 506 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Donaher]. Persons of limited reading
ability could also be included in this group.
14 1 Id. at 509.






15 Epstein, supra note 8, at 654. The writer states that one example would
be the consumer who poured cologne on a lighted Christmas tree candle to see
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manner should be reasonably foreseeable in order for the manu-
facturer to be held liable." Second, the manufacturer must have
the ability to anticipate that the person who is likely to use the
product would be unaware of its risk and of the nature of the harm
that is likely to be incurred."' As the seriousness of the potential
harm increases, the duty to warn becomes greater."' As indicated
earlier,"' the focus of the UPLA is entirely on the user of the
product and not on the class of consumers who may be unaware
of the warning.
The final two factors concern the technological and practical
feasibility of providing effective warnings and the clarity and con-
spicuousness of the warnings." The duty to provide a warning
cannot go beyond the technological information available to the
manufacturer at the time of manufacture. "1 In most cases prac-
tical feasibility is not a problem since warning defects-, unlike de-
sign defects, are relatively simple and inexpensive to provide."'
The fourth factor, the clarity and conspicuousness of the warning,
is concerned with determining whether the warning that was given
was adequate.1" The Act does not provide a standard by which
to measure adequacy. The standards of the industry and the
standards of the manufacturer should be unacceptable. The trier
of fact instead should ask whether the warning would alert an ordi-
nary consumer to the danger involved.
For a warning to be considered "adequate", Professor Phillips
has noted that it must be "conspicuous, strong, and clear."'" The
whether it was scented. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11
(1975).
'-" See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (foresee-
able that child might drink furniture polish); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-
Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (unforeseeable that soda
bottle would be used as hammer); Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App.
220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932) (foreseeable that coffee grounds would be eaten). See
also Fischer, supra note 31, at 618.
157 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
18 Id.
119 See notes 146-47 supra and accompanying text.




114 Phillips, supra note 47, at 3 51.
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Act adopts this definition.1" Professor Phillips also states that a
warning must describe the potential danger and the means of
avoiding it.1"' In doing this, the manufacturer should be aware of
contradictory statements and should avoid the use of technical
terms. 6' There is also the danger that the warning may be too nar-
row in its scope. 6' In some instances, the intensity of the warning
may be undermined by representations of safety which can be con-
veyed by the title of the product16 or through advertisements.
The UPLA provides that little or no warning will be necessary
for a person accustomed to using the product, but a clear and
strong warning will be required when the manufacturer can
reasonably expect the product to be used by a person who is
unfamiliar with it." It may be difficult to draw a clear line between
the inexperienced and the expert user. It is also possible that a
product which is used for the most part by experts or other per-
sons who realize the risk involved will occasionally be used by an
inexperienced consumer."1 By imposing a duty to warn of the
dangers on all products, the do-it-yourself user would be pro-
tected' 12
Under the UPLA a causation link also must be established
between the lack of or inadequacy of the warning or instructions
and the plaintiff's injuries."" The plaintiff must show that the in-
jury would not have occurred had adequate warnings or instruc-
tions been given since a reasonably prudent person either would
have declined to use the product or would have used it in a man-
ner that would have avoided the harm.1" Professor Twerski has
convincingly argued, however, that this causation requirement
serves no purpose when the injury results from a nonreducible risk,
16144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
166 Phillips, supra note 47, at 351.
167McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d
712 (1953).
168 Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974)
(warning encompassed danger of inhaling toxic fumes, not danger of explosion).
16 Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (Safety-Kleen).
170 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
171 Noel, supra note 135, at 273.
172 Id.
1"44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
174 Id.
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such as that associated with drugs and industrial chemicals."' The
purpose of the warning in these cases is to ensure that the con-
sumer's decision to use the product is based upon an intelligent
choice.'" To impose a duty to warn only where a reasonable per-
son would choose not to use the product destroys the assurance
that the user is acting with informed consent."
The UPLA does not require the manufacturer to warn about
dangers which are obvious.' Several writers have stated that un-
necessary warnings can reduce the effectiveness of all warnings."9
The danger exists that consumers will become jaded to warnings
in general.' 9 The obviousness of the danger should not serve as
an excuse, however, if there is the possibility that the extent of
the danger will not be fully appreciated.' In these instances, pro-
viding an adequate warning would be a simple matter."' It is also
made clear under the Act that the obviousness of the danger will
not prevent liability if the danger is due to an unreasonably unsafe
design.' Thus, only a product that is deemed to be "unavoidably
unsafe"'" and whose danger is obvious will escape the requirement
that a warning be given.
'15 Twerski, supra note 47, at 236.
176 Id.
177 Id.
17844 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979). See also Simpson v. Hurst Perform-
ance Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (no duty to warn of dangers
arising from hitting stick shift of automobile during accident); Berry v. Eckhardt
Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1978) (no duty to warn of con-
sequences of nonuse of seatbelts); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560
P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977) (no duty to warn of obvious danger of being electrocuted
if life cable touched high voltage lines); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373
A.2d 505 (Vt. 1977) (no duty to warn of potential eye injury caused by dis-
charging BB gun).
'7 Donaher, supra note 147, at 514.
11"Id. at 513-14.
"I Marschell, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturer's
Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Marschell]. See also Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d
815 (10th Cir. 1979) (risk of explosion due to mounting automobile tire on
wrong size rim); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., 93 Nev.
158, 561 P.2d 450 (Nov. 1977) (risk of explosion due to spark emitted from
electric utility cart used in chemical plant).
182 Marschell, supra note 181, at 1079.
"044 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979).
' "'"There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
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The UPLA also acknowledges the existence of a "post-manufac-
ture" duty to warn."' It has long been recognized that a seller has
a continuing duty to provide needed warnings after the sale.8"
Some courts have been especially willing to impose liability for
failure to fulfill this duty where the magnitude of the potential
danger was great... or where the burden of providing a warning
was small.'88 It is not entirely clear what actions the UPLA would
require the manufacturer to take. The UPLA merely provides that
he must act as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in discovering
any serious risks connected with the product after it is manufac-
tured, and that he must take reasonable steps to warn the pur-
chaser if any risks are discovered.'9
The meaning of "reasonableness" is the key issue. It is unclear
whether the UPLA would require that a warning be given when
the cost of providing an effective warning is high and the risk of
potential harm is minimal. In such cases, a general warning through
advertising would probably be sufficient."4 This also would be true
if the number of purchasers were large and the manufacturer has
no way of contacting each one individually. When the danger in-
volved is substantial, the manufacturer must make a greater effort
to contact the individual."' If at all possible, the manufacturer
must contact the individual personally. In some instances, he may
be required to make steps such as offering to correct the problem
without charge.9
These are especially common in the field of drugs." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
'll44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979).
18 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 241-42 (3rd Cir. 1964).
117Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968)
(action by plaintiff against manufacturer of polio vaccine seeking damages re-
sulting from plaintiff's contraction of polio after taking vaccine).
"I Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (list of doctors
easily available for mailing warning); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969) (small number of users of airplane engines).
119 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979).
190 Id.
"I' Phillips, supra note 48, at 333.
192 Id.
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D. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because It Did Not
Conform to an Express Warranty
A breach of the seller's express warranty is the final basis that
may be used to establish the manufacturer's liability for producing
a defective product. A breach of warranty action is not based upon
negligence or upon the failure to exercise reasonable care. "
Liability arises when the product fails to measure up to the express
or implied representations of the manufacturer." ' The UPLA does
not require the injured plaintiff to establish negligence on the part
of the manufacturer; strict liability is imposed in all products lia-
bility warranty cases.' Therefore, as in cases involving manufac-
turing defects, the attention of the trier of fact should be focused
on the condition of the product rather than on the conduct of the
manufacturer. "' This is in accordance with prior case law' and
with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 9 8
The UPLA defines an express warranty as any "positive state-
ment, affirmation of fact, promise, description, sample, or model
relating to the product.199. The statement must refer to a material
fact about the product; "puffing" or mere sales talk is not action-
able.' In recent years, however, courts have moved towards nar-
rowing the scope of "puffing" and have chosen to expand the lia-
bility of manufacturers for broad statements concerning the quality
of their products.' By imposing absolute liability, the burden of
proof will be on the manufacturer to show that the language used
does not constitute an express warranty.
"I FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 3A-3.
194Id.
19544 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,720 (1979).
'1 Id.
19 7 Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874, 885
(1974) (no need to show negligence in warranty case); Awedian v. Theodore
Efron Mfg. Co., 66 Mich. App. 353, 239 N.W.2d 611 (1976) (plaintiff not
required to show negligence but must show existence of defect and causal
relationship to injury); Tully v. Empire Equip. Corp., 28 A.2d 935, 282 N.Y.S.2d.
322 (1967) (instruction given in terms of negligence and reasonable care was
erroneous).
1912 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402B (1965).
19944 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,720 (1979).
20Id. at 62,726.
0Hauler v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 112, 534 P.2d 377, 381, 120 Cal. Rptr.
681, 685 (1977).
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To recover for a breach of warranty claim under the UPLA, a
plaintiff will be required to establish the following factors: first, that
he did in fact rely on the express warranty; second, that a causa-
tion link exists between the harm incurred and the manufacturer's
representations; and third, that the warranty was directed toward
the plaintiff.' The Act also imputes reliance to a plaintiff if a
person acts on his behalf, such as a husband or wife.3 It is unclear
whether the concept of "imputed reliance" is limited to those who
are members of the purchaser's immediate family, or whether it
can be extended to friends, guests, or even bystanders. Several
cases have held that the manufacturer's express warranty should
be extended to the benefit of a non-purchasing user. ' The re-
quirement of reliance can produce harsh results in some instances.
If the injured party is a non-purchasing user or bystander who fails
to receive the benefit of the manufacturer's warning, and who is
unable to establish the existence of a construction or design defect,
a further penalty would result since the injured party would not
be allowed to benefit from the purchaser's reliance on the express
warranty. If the purchaser had not been induced to buy the product,
the user or bystander would not have incurred his injury.'
III. CONCLUSION
Some type of a uniform product liability law needs to be adopted.
Although product liability is a relatively new area of the law, it
is an area which has spawned much litigation. Various courts and
noted authorities continue to disagree over the standards to be
imposed on a manufacturer who places a defective product into
the stream of commerce. By imposing two separate standards, the
UPLA appears to have achieved a compromise.
One standard alone would be ineffective; products liability re-
20244 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979).
=o Id.
204Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946) (co-worker en-
titled to benefit from express warranty); Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp.
120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (fact of reliance irrelevant in cause of action by passenger
in auto for breach of express warranty); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54
Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960) (employee considered part
of "individual family" of employer).
2' FRIEDMAN & FRUMER, supra note 15, at 3A-268.
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quires the application of strict liability for some defects and the
application of negligence for others. Few would disagree that strict
liability should be imposed for defects in construction. The manu-
facturer has total control over the production process, and there
is little that a consumer can do to protect himself from such de-
fects. Conversely, there is considerable disagreement over the
standard that should be imposed for design defects. The Barker
court's analysis offers the most effective approach. Unlike the
approach of the UPLA, the analysis in Barker would impose strict
liability for design defects. It would not impose liability in the strict
sense that it is imposed for construction defects. There is no place
for a risk-utility analysis in evaluating construction defects-abso-
lute liability is required. In evaluating design defects, however, the
manufacturer may avoid liability if he is able to show that the
balance of the risk-utility factors falls in his favor.
Fault can be found in uniformly imposing a negligence standard
for a failure to warn of possible defects. In the majority of situa-
tions the UPLA's negligence standard would be the correct ap-
proach, but it is inappropriate in cases where the injury is in-
curred by a child, a bystander, or by a person of limited reading
ability. A proper warning will not serve to reduce the risk which
confronts these groups of consumers. These limited circumstances
suggest that a need for absolute liability exists.
The strict liability standard imposed for a defect arising from a
breach of an express warranty is consistent with prior case law.
Since the manufacturer is specifically inducing the consumer to
purchase his product, strict liability can be readily justified. The
plaintiff must show only reliance and causation in order to recover
for his injury.
When product liability first became recognized as an area of
tort law, courts displayed considerable confusion concerning the
standards that should be applied to manufacturers' conduct. This
confusion has led to inconsistent results. The adoption of a uni-
form products liability law would be a significant advancement
in this area. The UPLA should be applauded as it takes a major
step in this direction. With a few adjustments, it may be the answer
for a complex and confusing area of the law.
"I See notes 96-102 supra and accompanying text.
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